When is a final judgment not final? In an opinion by Justice Thomas unanimously reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court reaffirmed on June 5 that the bar for reopening a final judgment under the catchall provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) remains exceptionally high—even when the movant seeks to amend their complaint based on a new legal development.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)-(5) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment and reopen a case, typically within one year of the judgment. Specific grounds for relief include mistake or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud or misconduct by an opposing party. The court may also reopen a judgment where it is void, where it has been satisfied or discharged, or where applying it is no longer equitable. Rule 60(b)(6) is a "catchall" provision allowing a district court to reopen a case for "any other reason that justifies relief." The Supreme Court has consistently held that only extraordinary circumstances justify reopening a case under Rule 60(b)(6).
But what qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance? Does an extraordinary circumstance include amending a complaint when the district court applied the wrong standard in its initial dismissal?
The Supreme Court addressed these questions in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman. The opinion resolves a growing tension among courts regarding the intersection between Rule 60(b)'s finality principles and Rule 15(a)'s liberal policy favoring amendments to pleadings. In a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed the Second Circuit's more flexible approach, holding that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard is no less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint.
In BLOM, plaintiffs declined several opportunities to amend their complaint. Instead, they opted to stand on their original pleadings and then appeal after the district court dismissed their complaint with prejudice for failing to plead facts sufficient to support their aiding and abetting claim. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that the district court imposed too high a foreseeability requirement in dismissing the aiding-and-abetting claim, but concluding that the claim failed under the correct, less exacting standard. Returning to the district court, plaintiffs moved under Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the already-affirmed final judgment, arguing that the district court should grant them an opportunity to file an amended complaint under the correct standard. The district court denied the motion, holding that the Second Circuit's clarification of the standard did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" necessary to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Plaintiffs again appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district court must balance Rule 60(b)'s finality principles and Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy.
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's approach, holding that "a party seeking to reopen his case and replead must first satisfy Rule 60(b) on its own terms and obtain Rule 60(b) relief before Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment standard can apply." Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this "standard does not change when a party seeks to reopen his case to amend his complaint."
The Court emphasized the importance of Rule 60(b)'s finality principles, especially since there is no time bar for bringing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Too broad an interpretation of this catchall provision would circumvent the time limitations of Rule 60(b)(1)-(3). Litigation must end at some point, and "free, calculated, deliberate choices," such as plaintiffs' decision not to amend their complaint when given the opportunity, "are not to be relieved from." A strict interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6) is "essential to preserve the finality of judgments."
Courts must therefore apply Rule 60(b) before any application of Rule 15(a). As Justice Thomas wrote, "Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy therefore cannot weaken Rule 60(b)(6)'s 'extraordinary circumstances' standard." The Court stressed that "[i]t is Rule 60(b)'s standard—and only Rule 60(b)'s standard—that applies when a party seeks relief from final judgment." The moving party's intention upon reopening does not alter the Rule 60(b) standard.
Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment and joined all but Part III of the Court's opinion. She wrote separately to emphasize that "assuming extraordinary circumstances otherwise exist, a plaintiff should not be faulted under Rule 60(b)(6) for reasonably having chosen to appeal rather than amend his complaint."
BLOM reinforces the sanctity of final judgments. Parties should carefully consider their litigation strategy and preserve all procedural options before judgment is entered. Prompt amendments are key, and the Court made clear that litigators cannot rely on Rule 60(b)(6) as a safety net—final really does mean final.
* The authors thank Kaitlyn Chambers, a summer associate in our San Francisco office, for her assistance in writing this article.