On March 10, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice issued its first-ever department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) governing all corporate criminal investigations except those relating to antitrust matters. The new policy replaces what had become a coordinated but fragmented system of component- and district-level voluntary self-disclosure frameworks adopted since 2022, after then-Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco directed every DOJ component prosecuting corporate crime to adopt written corporate enforcement policies. The department-wide CEP expressly supersedes those component- and district-level policies, including SDNY’s corporate enforcement policy issued only weeks ago.
The new framework builds on the Criminal Division’s CEP, first formalized in 2016 and developed over the past decade, and extends that model across the Department while refining key standards, including the treatment of recidivism, cooperation expectations, and “near miss” resolutions.
The Framework
The department-wide CEP retains the structure of the Criminal Division’s May 2025 policy.
- Declinations: A company will receive a declination if it (1) voluntarily self-discloses misconduct; (2) fully cooperates; (3) timely and appropriately remediates; and (4) lacks aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances include the nature and seriousness of the offense, egregiousness or pervasiveness of misconduct, severity of harm, and corporate recidivism. Companies must pay disgorgement or forfeiture and restitution, which could be resolved through a parallel civil or administrative forfeiture proceeding, even though no criminal charges are filed.
- “Near Miss” Cases: Where a company fully cooperates and remediates but does not qualify for declination because the self-report did not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure and/or it had aggravating factors that were not particularly egregious, the company will receive a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) of fewer than three years and a discount between 50% and 75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) fine range. No independent compliance monitor will be required. Disgorgement, forfeiture, restitution, and other financial penalties would be addressed through the NPA.
- Other Resolutions: For companies that do not qualify for declination or near miss treatment, prosecutors retain discretion over the form of resolution, monitor requirements, and penalties. Fine reductions of up to 50% of the USSG range remain available for companies that cooperate and remediate, and other monetary penalties may be imposed through a DPA, plea agreement, or other charging instrument.
Key Changes from the Criminal Division’s 2025 CEP
Although the overall structure remains intact, the new policy introduces several notable refinements from the Criminal Division CEP:
- Department-Wide Application: The standards that previously governed Criminal Division matters now apply across the Department.
- Broader Recidivism Analysis: The 2025 CEP referenced a five-year lookback for certain prior criminal resolutions. The new policy adopts a more flexible, fact-specific approach to prior misconduct that is similar in nature to the current misconduct.
- Penalty Mitigation Range in Near Miss Cases: The Criminal Division CEP included a flat 75% fine reduction in near miss cases. The new policy provides a 50% to 75% range.
- Streamlined Cooperation Standard: The prior CEP set out detailed, enumerated cooperation expectations. The new policy consolidates those requirements into a broader obligation to provide “timely, truthful, and complete disclosure of relevant, non-privileged facts and evidence.”
- Mandatory Publication and Explanation of Cooperation Credit: While the Criminal Division often publicized declinations in practice, publication was not a uniform requirement. The new policy expressly requires that declinations be made public. It also instructs prosecutors to include in corporate resolution agreements “information sufficient to outline why a particular company received a particular amount of cooperation credit.”
Implications for Companies
The new policy does not fundamentally alter DOJ’s incentive-based approach to corporate criminal enforcement, but it does standardize it. Companies should expect greater consistency in how the standards for voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation are applied across the Department.
That consistency allows companies to assess the potential benefits and risks of voluntary self-disclosure with greater confidence. With a single framework governing declinations, near miss outcomes, and penalty mitigation ranges, resolution expectations should be less dependent on which office or component is handling the case.
At the same time, the new policy makes clear that eligibility for structured benefits depends on the underlying facts. The broadened, fact-specific approach to recidivism suggests that repeat-offender status may carry greater weight, even where earlier matters fall outside a defined time period. And granting prosecutors discretion to set the fine reduction in near miss cases means the extent of penalty mitigation will turn on the seriousness of the conduct and the quality of the company’s cooperation and remediation. Companies seeking the most favorable outcome will need to focus on early fact development and credible, well-documented compliance improvements, even where they are not eligible for voluntary self-disclosure credit.
The added transparency provisions complement that increased uniformity. Because declinations must be public and cooperation credit must be explained in resolution agreements, DOJ’s application of the framework will be easier to compare across cases. That visibility may promote greater consistency over time, but it also creates potential exposure, as public declination letters and detailed explanations of cooperation credit may be scrutinized closely in related civil matters. Companies should take this into consideration when assessing disclosure and resolution strategy.