In a sharp rebuff to the EEOC, the federal appellate court with
jurisdiction over Maryland, Virginia, and other mid-Atlantic
states has affirmed an award of attorneys' fees of over $200,000
against the agency. The case, EEOC v. Clay Printing Company, No.
93-1065 (4th Cir. 1994), arose out of an unsuccessful suit filed
by the EEOC under the Age Discrimination Act. The opinion is
important as a guidepost for judging the merits of bias cases
when private sector defendants seek fees and expenses from the
government, and may reign in EEOC aggressiveness in borderline
cases.
The EEOC sued Clay Printing, alleging discrimination on the basis
of age in twenty-three individual cases. After successfully
having all claims dismissed before trial, the Company sought to
recover its attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act. This federal law was enacted to punish the government for
the use of its "vast resources in baseless litigation" against
private citizens. It permits private parties to recover fees and
expenses when the government's case is not "substantially
justified."
Although the EEOC investigated the Clay case for two and a half
years before filing suit, and then the parties conducted ten
months of discovery after the suit was filed, the District Court
characterized the EEOC's claims as, "to say the least, simply
implausible." On appeal the agency fared no better, with the
court finding that the EEOC had attempted to put its case
together out of "little more than thin air." Against this
background, the District Court awarded Clay Printing its fees and
costs under the EAJA.
The EEOC's appeal of the fee award alleged that the District
Court's use of the EAJA's "substantial justification" standard
was error, and that the lower court had not gotten the facts
right. The Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments. Rejecting
the attempt to "spin" the facts, the appellate court held that
the case could be disposed of solely by the "objective indicia"
of the EEOC's unreasonableness.
The EEOC had failed to convince the District Court or the Fourth
Circuit of the merits of any of its twenty-three claims -- even
when all it had to do to avoid summary judgment was to produce a
"minimal" factual basis for its suits. The Court also noted the
"woeful" evidentiary basis for the EEOC's case. In short, the
suit failed "quickly and completely." The dissent of a judge
from the EEOC's losing appeal was possible evidence of merit, but
did not provide enough of a basis to overturn the lower court's
fee award.