During the recent oral arguments in Chatrie v. United States, the Supreme Court Justices sounded almost as fractured as the Fourth Circuit's en banc panel over how the Fourth Amendment applies to law enforcement's use of geofence warrants. (We've written previously here, here, and here about the bubbling constitutional challenge.) Okello Chatrie was convicted of bank robbery on evidence that his phone was in the vicinity of the bank at the time of the crime. That evidence was obtained through a geofence warrant, which compels companies like Google to provide cellphone location history data for every one of their users within a particular area during a particular time. Mr. Chatrie's appeal is one of several recent decisions involving the Fourth Amendment, as the appellate courts continue to grapple with how to draw lines in an age of ubiquitous smartphones between an individual's right to privacy and the interests of law enforcement.
This case highlights outstanding questions with broad implications. Does using a smartphone to locate the nearest coffee shop equate to consent for the government to obtain a user's location data for a particular time within a particular geographic area? Should law enforcement have to make a showing of particularized suspicion as to every phone near a crime scene to obtain more information about its user? How the Court answers these questions could have lasting impacts not just on federal and state criminal law, but even on seemingly far-removed areas of the law like lobster fishing regulations in the Northeast. Read more to learn how.
Chatrie v. United States—Geofence Warrant Without Particularized Probable Cause and Using Cellphone Location Data to Identify a Suspect
The question before the Supreme Court in Chatrie was whether the execution of a geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. To answer that question, the Court must first decide whether the government's request for user location history data was a "search," which, in large part, hinges on whether the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own data.
In 2019, Virginia law enforcement officers were struggling to identify a bank robber outside of Richmond. To generate leads, they sought a geofence warrant to compel Google to turn over location information generated by smartphone users in the area. But a geofence is different from other forms of cellphone location information: instead of targeting a specific phone, it sweeps in every user who enters a defined space during a set time, allowing law enforcement to review anonymized profiles to narrow their search. Through a three-step process administered by Google, and without obtaining any additional search warrants, law enforcement eventually got the name of their suspect, who was then convicted for bank robbery.
The Justices wrestled with how to conceptualize the technology and then to fit that concept into a constitutional framework. One issue central to the oral arguments: how does location history data collection work? Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito equated location history data collection to an app or a feature that could easily be turned on or off and, therefore, suggested that there was no search because Chatrie voluntarily disclosed his location information to Google. Justice Sotomayor, in contrast, questioned whether the disclosure was voluntary if it is, in fact, difficult to turn off the relevant smartphone feature.
Another central issue: whether accepting terms of service could be enough to justify warrantless data storage searches. To use a cellular provider, the user must accept its terms of service. Does that mean that the user thereby consents to searches of their cellphone-related data? What would be the scope of that consent?
If a majority of the Court were to agree with Chatrie that the geofence warrant was a search and the government lacked sufficient probable cause, it could issue an opinion that significantly constrains law enforcement's ability to rely on these warrants. Alternatively, were a majority of the Justices to conclude that people voluntarily give up any expectation of privacy for any of their data stored with a provider upon agreeing to that provider's terms of use, the government could be allowed warrantless access to any of that data—including email, calendar, and location data.
Chatrie Reflects Growing Tension Between the Right to Privacy and the Realities of Modern Living
What do convicted felons have to do with Maine's lobster fishermen? Recent cases like Chatrie, a Pennsylvania kidnapping investigation, and Maine's lobster industry illustrate a common Fourth Amendment problem: how courts should evaluate privacy claims when modern technology makes extensive data collection routine.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kurtz—Reverse Keyword Search Warrant Without Individualized Probable Cause
The Pennsylvania State Police had no idea who kidnapped a woman from her home in a remote area and then assaulted her—there was no DNA match, and the woman could not identify her assailant. Given the remoteness of the location and the timing and nature of the attack, however, the police surmised that the attack might have been planned. How does a would-be assailant research a potential crime? As the court noted, you "Google" it.
On that basis, the police applied for, and obtained, a reverse keyword search warrant for all searches performed on Google's search engine the week before the assault that included the victim's name or address. The information resulting from the warrant provided the police with the name of a possible suspect: John Edward Kurtz. From there, the police collected enough evidence to arrest and interrogate Mr. Kurtz about the assault. Mr. Kurtz was convicted and appealed, arguing that the police did not have the individualized probable cause needed for the initial warrant.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not agree with Mr. Kurtz. It reasoned that people know that Google will collect and store their search queries and IP address whenever they perform a Google search. These users therefore waive any expectation of privacy in their internet use. Thus, individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home IP address in their private internet searches, and the government could obtain the reverse keyword search warrant without needing individualized probable cause.
As in Chatrie, the Court had to decide whether users gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy because they voluntarily consented to Google's terms—and what "voluntary" means in this context. On the one hand, as the majority suggested, Mr. Kurtz could have navigated to the Google home page, clicked the "Privacy" tab in the bottom-right hand corner, and thereby have been informed that Google collects certain information. On the other, as the dissent noted, using internet search engines may be necessary to participate in society. And the breadth of data collected by these engines on each user may, indeed, provide "a virtual current biography" of that user.
Thompson v. Wilson—Automatic and Continuous Tracking for All Lobster Boats
To reduce the risk of right whale entanglement in fishing lines, and to provide more data on fishery management and related issues, Maine adopted a rule requiring all Maine lobstermen holding federal lobster fishing permits to install a GPS tracker on their boats. This tracker shares their positions every minute when the boats are in the water and moving, or every six hours when not moving. It is required to transmit, no matter whether, or what, the lobstermen are fishing. The devices could (in principle) collect other data, such as voice or speed, in addition to GPS locations.
Because lobstermen use their boats for personal matters, including errands, family visits, and, for some, as a place to live, the district court acknowledged their legitimate privacy concerns over government intrusion with the tracking devices. The government generally does not have the right to require someone, or something, to wear a device that tracks their location. Since the lobstermen conceded that lobstering is a "closely-regulated industry," however, the district court found that the government had a broader search authority. Closely-regulated industries have extensive regulatory regimes, and industry participants have a reduced expectation of privacy in ensuring these are enforced. Certain types of warrantless searches for enforcement purposes are permissible within these industries. The First Circuit upheld the decision on appeal. Mr. Thompson, the plaintiff lobsterman, recently filed a cert petition.
As in Chatrie, the court of appeals faced a question of consent in the context of technology and the government interest in data collection and searches. Because he is a lobsterman and needs to fish in waters where lobsters reside, did Mr. Thompson knowingly and voluntarily consent to 24/7, minute-by-minute monitoring of his moving boat regardless of whether he is fishing, visiting family, or enjoying a day on the water? On the other hand, shouldn't we provide the government with available resources that enhance its ability to enforce important regulations like those that protect endangered species?
Conclusion
In each of these cases, privacy in the modern day is being tested. The consequences could be wide ranging, from enhanced law enforcement capability to unwelcome intrusion into cellphones to inability to work in a chosen profession without near-constant government scrutiny. Venable's appellate and regulatory litigators will continue to monitor these developments and advise clients on their implications for digital privacy, enforcement, and regulated-industry compliance.
References
Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112, oral argument transcript (US 4/27/2026).
Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 348 A.3d 133, 138-39 (Pa. 2025).
Thompson v. Keliher, 2024 WL 4851243, at *4 (D. Me. 2024).
Thompson v. Wilson, 159 F.4th 91, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2025).
United States v. Chatrie, 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025) (en banc).
United States v. Chatrie, 590 F. Supp. 3d 901 (E.D. Va. 2022).
United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2024).