On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court held in a 6-3 decision in Trump v. Slaughter that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act's for-cause removal provision is unconstitutional. The Court overruled Humphrey's Executor v. United States and held that statutory restrictions on the President's ability to remove FTC Commissioners violate the separation of powers.
The separation of powers is a fundamental tenet of our democracy. The United States Constitution diffuses the authority of the federal government across three branches, each with a distinct set of constitutional responsibilities. Exercising its legislative authority, Congress has created administrative agencies—federal organizations housed in the executive branch who act with power delegated from Congress to promulgate rules, investigate violations of those rules, and carry out adjudications. For decades, Congress made choices about not only the structure of those agencies, but also the degree of direct presidential control over agency leadership.
Where Congress structures an agency to be led by a single agency head, the Court has held that Article II generally requires the President to be able to remove the agency head at any time, for any reason. In contrast, Congress has long been able to insulate independent agencies, those led by a multi-member body of experts who serve staggered terms, from direct political control. In its 1935 decision in Humphrey's Executor, the Supreme Court held that Congress could, consistent with the constitutional separation of powers, protect FTC commissioners from removal by the President without cause. The Court reasoned that FTC commissioners exercised quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative power and could therefore be protected from removal by the President. In Slaughter, the Supreme Court overruled that 91-year-old precedent and declared those for-cause removal protections unconstitutional.
This case began when FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter challenged President Donald Trump's decision to fire her without cause. President Trump stated that Commissioner Slaughter's continued service would not align with his administration's priorities. Slaughter argued that her removal violated the FTC Act, which provides that Commissioners may be removed by the President only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." President Trump countered that Article II vests the entirety of executive power in the President and prohibits any limitations on the President's ability to control executive power wielded by agency heads. Concluding it was bound by Humphrey's Executor, the district court granted summary judgment for Slaughter, and the D.C. Circuit denied the government's request for a stay. The Supreme Court then stayed the district court's order and granted certiorari before judgment.
Deciding the merits, the Court overruled Humphrey's Executor. Relying on the text, history, and structure of the Constitution, the Court found that the unity of the executive branch requires that the President be able to remove officers who exercise executive power. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that Article II vests the entire executive power in the President of the United States. Agency heads exercising that power are "envoys of the President, not his equals," and the President must be able to remove those exercising executive power against his wishes to ensure that he can carry out his responsibilities as required by the Constitution.
Given these principles, the Court stated that Slaughter "is not a close case." The FTC administers and enforces numerous federal statutes, promulgates rules that carry out the force of law, investigates regulated businesses, conducts in-house investigations, and files civil suits on behalf of the United States in federal court. The Court explained that these were "unquestionably" exercises of executive power, which must be controlled by the President.
The Court recognized the limits of its holding. It did not decide whether removal provisions may be constitutional for certain offices or functions traditionally handled outside of the executive branch. The Court identified the Federal Reserve as one possible example. And in Trump v. Cook, decided the same day, the Court denied the government's stay application, rejecting the government's arguments that "would in effect transform the Federal Reserve's for-cause protection into at-will employment," which it found was "out of step" with both the statute and the "tradition of central banking protected from political interference."
Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion emphasizing the accumulation of power in the President following from the Court's decision and raising caution about what he viewed as the potential consequences of that power. Justice Gorsuch noted that while the Court's opinion may have done away with the "fourth branch" of government—the independent agencies—"the fourth branch's powers still exist; they have just been reassigned to the President." Justice Gorsuch noted that while the Court's decision does not directly address Congress's delegations of power to agencies, it may change their significance by making the officials exercising those delegations directly answerable to the President. But he expressed his view that this is not "enough on its own," and that Congress and the judiciary should take further steps to enforce the proper division of power between the branches.
Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. In Justice Sotomayor's view, the Court's decision is a "profound bait and switch" that is "egregiously wrong." Remarking that the Court "forgets its place," Sotomayor explained that historical practice and the Court's precedent strongly supported Congress's authority to impose for-cause removal protections for FTC Commissioners and similarly situated officers.
This ruling impacts not only the FTC, but the members and commissioners of dozens of independent agencies with similar removal provisions—including Merit Systems Protection Board Member Cathy Harris, who has challenged her removal by President Trump, arguing, similarly to Slaughter, that the President did not comply with the for-cause removal provisions. The decision reflects the Court's growing skepticism toward aspects of the modern administrative state, and its continuing shift toward a broader conception of presidential control over executive power.
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The authors thank Katherine A. Smith, a summer associate in our Tysons, VA office, for her assistance in writing this article.