On February 17, 2026, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") proposed a significant overhaul of its internal appeals process for banks that would make it easier for them to challenge exam findings. According to the OCC, this proposal is designed to increase the independence of the current appeals process, improve transparency in OCC decision-making standards, and ensure that banks feel comfortable submitting appeals without fear of retaliation.
OCC Proposal
While the OCC's notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM") proposes several structural and procedural changes to its existing bank appeals framework, there are five high-level changes that OCC-supervised banks and their partners will want to pay attention to.
1. Appeals Board
The NPRM would replace the adjudicatory role currently played by the OCC Ombudsman with a three-member appeals board. The appeals board would consist of the Chief National Bank Examiner and two outside term appointees with relevant banking or supervisory experience. Those term appointees would serve one-year, nonrenewable terms to mitigate concerns that members might favor the agency to secure reappointment. Banks could file appeals directly with this appeals board or with the Deputy Comptroller responsible for the unit that issued the determination that is in dispute. However, the OCC would retain discretion to escalate appeals to the new appeals board in some circumstances. The NPRM would codify the publication of redacted appeals board decisions (and any dissents), formalizing an existing practice, reinforcing transparency in the OCC's appeals process, and potentially providing useful guidance to OCC-supervised institutions. Note that the Comptroller of the Currency would have the ability to overturn any decision by the appeals board.
2. De Novo Standard of Review
The OCC's proposed appeals process would also formally adopt a de novo standard of review. Under the OCC's current appeals guidance, no specific review standard is applied. The NPRM proposes a de novo standard that is "not deferential to either party," and that would require the reviewer to consider the matter anew without deferring to the prior supervisory determination. The adoption of this standard is designed to address concerns—identified by the OCC in the NPRM—that the current process lacks a clearly articulated standard and is perceived as overly deferential to examination staff.
3. Same Appeals Coverage, New Codification, and Applicability
While the NPRM largely preserves the existing categories of appealable and non-appealable matters, it would codify them in regulation (rather than guidance) and clarify their application. Examination ratings, loan classifications, matters requiring attention (and other conclusions in examination reports), Shared National Credit decisions, fair-lending referrals, and licensing determinations would remain appealable. Formal enforcement actions, appointments of receivers or conservators, prompt corrective action determinations, and other non-final or judicially reviewable actions would continue to be excluded. The proposal also refines when appeals are foreclosed once a formal enforcement action has been approved and expands the definition of "supervised entity" eligible to invoke the process to include entities beyond insured depository institutions, such as national trust banks and permitted stablecoin issuers.
4. Stay of Appeal Formalization
The OCC's existing appeals process generally does not allow for supervisory determinations to be stayed pending appeal. Under the current process, banks can make written requests for exceptions. Still, the OCC's Ombudsman must receive approval from the Comptroller of the Currency to grant an exception, and there are no clear standards for when an exception may be granted.
By contrast, the NPRM would require the Deputy Comptroller or appeals board to grant a stay if the appellant requests one and three conditions are satisfied: (i) delaying implementation would not pose a risk of immediate financial harm to an OCC-supervised institution; (ii) the determination would impose costs on the appellant within the time frame for deciding the appeal; and (iii) the public interest would not be harmed by delay. The NPRM would also direct the relevant party overseeing an appeal to consider institution size and resource constraints when applying these standards, essentially creating a lower burden for smaller institutions. By formalizing and potentially broadening access to stays—particularly where expensive remediation efforts would otherwise be required before an appeal is resolved—the NPRM could potentially make the appeals process more appealing, no pun intended.
5. Redefined Ombudsman Role
The NPRM would also strengthen and formalize protections against retaliation, moving beyond the safeguards embedded in prior guidance. Specifically, it would prohibit the OCC from retaliating against a supervised entity for filing an appeal or otherwise raising concerns, defining retaliation as treating the entity more harshly than similarly situated institutions because it exercised its appeal rights. It would likewise forbid agency personnel from discouraging institutions from pursuing appeals or contacting the Ombudsman or Comptroller. Critically, the proposal adds a new substantive constraint: if the appeals board overturns a material supervisory determination, the OCC may not later impose a "substantially similar" determination based on the same underlying facts. This provision is aimed directly at the OCC's concern that institutions may fear relationship damage or that supervisors will seek a "do-over" if an institution appeals and prevails. By embedding these protections in regulation, expanding the Ombudsman's oversight role to monitor for retaliation, and tying supervisory staff to appeals board conclusions, the NPRM's proposed appeals process seeks to offer more meaningful, consequence-bearing reviews.
OCC Moves Closer to the FDIC
Roughly three weeks before the OCC's NPRM was published, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") published separate guidelines to clarify its appeals process. In many ways, the OCC's NPRM and the FDIC's guidelines are similar: they establish multi-member independent review bodies, codify de novo standards for review, and formally provide for the publication of redacted appeals decisions. However, the OCC's proposal goes further in certain respects by embedding its framework in regulation rather than guidance, articulating detailed standards for granting stays pending appeal, and creating more formal anti-retaliation rules.
Expected Impact
Together, the OCC and FDIC appeals process changes reflect a broader regulatory shift toward a more collaborative supervisory process that gives supervised institutions more opportunities to challenge examiners' determinations. If adopted, the OCC's NPRM may have two key impacts.
First, more supervised institutions may file appeals. That is one of the OCC's explicit goals in the NPRM, and some of the proposed changes appear well-tailored to accomplish it. Filing an appeal will allow institutions to request a stay of supervisory determinations and create firm protections against retaliation, addressing two of the core reasons why institutions do not file appeals today. Moreover, the existence of a new, neutral arbiter in the OCC appeals board and a formal de novo review standard may make it easier for institutions to win appeals, changing the risk-reward calculus of filing appeals for OCC-supervised banks.
Second, the NPRM may also disincentivize so-called "stretch findings" during supervisory examinations. By codifying a de novo, non-deferential standard of review and placing appeals before a structurally independent appeals board that includes outside members, the proposal increases the likelihood that weakly supported or policy-driven determinations could be overturned on appeal. As a result, examiners may face greater institutional incentives to ensure that material supervisory determinations are tightly grounded in articulated supervisory standards and well-documented facts before issuance. In that sense, the NPRM would not only reform the back-end appeals process and make filing an appeal more attractive to supervised institutions, but it may also influence examiners' findings and determinations.
A Note for Fintechs
Although the appeal right belongs to the OCC-supervised bank and not a bank's fintech partners, fintech platforms operating in bank partnership models with OCC-regulated banks should still pay close attention to this proposal. The OCC's third-party oversight and examination authority means that supervisory findings directed at a bank often result in operational changes for the fintech, including remediation obligations, program modifications, or onboarding restrictions. A more credible, independent appeals process—combined with defined standards for obtaining a stay pending review—could reduce the risk of immediate disruption when a bank challenges an aggressive or novel supervisory determination. In that sense, even without direct appeal rights, fintech partners may benefit from the NPRM's proposed changes.
Conclusion
Comments on the NPRM are due by April 20, 2026. Banks and other OCC-supervised entities should evaluate how the proposed de novo review standard, appeals board structure, and clarified stay provisions may affect their supervisory strategy and internal governance around examination findings and consider filing a comment on the NPRM.